Brain and the Lexicon by Berio, Leda
RIVISTAITALIANADIFILOSOFIAANALITICAJUNIOR6:2(2015)
116
Sponsored since 2011 by theItalian Society for Analytic Philosophy ISSN 2037-4445 CC©http://www.rifanalitica.it
nyt
BRAIN AND THE LEXICON
[Turin, September, 21th-22st 2015]
Leda Berio
An international conference organized by the Center for Logic, Language and Cog-nition of the University of Turin took place in on of the great historical buildings ofthe city, the Rectorate Palace (Palazzo del Rettorato).The event, that saw the partecipation of some of the most famous experts inlexical processing and brain mechanisms, was part of a project, “The role of visualimagery in lexical processing”, funded by Compagnia di Sanpaolo, that investigatesthe role of perception and association mechanisms in lexical processing and con-ceptualisation. The project is coordinated by Diego Marconi, full professor at theUniversity of Turin.The conference developed in two days, counting six talks. Each speaker pre-sented the development of the research carried on in the last few years, focusing onhis/her area of expertise and interest. The result was a well-organised, stimulatingevent, where the debates after each talk allowed to see how the various disciplines(experts in lexico-semantics and psycholinguistics, neurologists and philosopherswere present) interact as far as the research on language and the brain mecha-nisms work. Moreover, several concurring views were presented, allowing to have adynamic and complete picture of the current debate and a clear view on the variedpositions regarding language use. The first part of this report will be dedicated toa overview concerning the event and the topics that have been presented during thetwo days of the conference. In the second part, I will focus on two talks in particular,namely Professor Vigliocco’s and Professor Pulvermüller’s ones, as I believe theycan be representative both of the event and of the current state of the research.On the first day, after the greetings by the Rector of the University, Prof. Gian-maria Ajani and an introduction by Prof. Marconi, the opening lecture was given byProf. Gabriella Vigliocco, by University College London, who is currently co-directorof the Deafness Cognition and Language Research Center in London. Her talk wasfocused on the role of emotional valence in the representation of abstract concepts
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and words, work that she has been carried on during the last six years of research.Professor Matthew Lambon Ralph is currently associate vice-president and di-rector of the Manchester Doctoral College at the University of Manchester andprofessor at the same university. He is also Senior Investigator Emeritus for theNIHR, and awarded the BPS President’s Award in 2015. He presented his talk,The role of anterior temporal regions in semantic cognition: convergent clinical andneuroscience data that focused on the contribution of the anterior temporal regionsin various semantic mechanisms, both verbal and non verbal. The talk focused on theimpairments in Semantic Dementia, which is a neurodegenerative condition char-acterised by anomia and poor verbal comprehension. Part of Professor’s LambonRalph’s focused on the exploration of the nature of the semantic deficits that arenot verbal (Bozeat et al, 2000) and in other studies he explored the deficits in Wer-nicke’s aphasia (Thompson et al, 2015). Particular attention was given to the role ofgeneralization of the ATP, as both overgeneralization and undergeneralization wereregistred (Lambon Ralph et al, 2009) in patients with semantic dementia.In the afternoon, Professor Friedemann Pulvermüller gave his lecture, From con-cepts to lexical semantics: is there a benefit?. Pulvermüller, a well known name inthe cognitive science panorama, is currently Chair in Neuroscience of Language andPragmatics at the Freie Universität Berlin, in the Brain Language Laboratory. Hisexperiences includes being Honorary Professorship at University of Malaga and ofSain Petersburg University, after a postdoc at Max Planck Institute for BiologicalCybernetics.Diego Marconi is professor of Philosophy of Language at the University of Torino.He previously taught at the University of Cagliari and at University of Eastern Pied-mont at Vercelli, along with Pittsburgh, Geneva and Barcellona. He was also pres-ident of the Italian Society for Analytic Philosophy (SIFA) and one of the foundersof European Society of Analytic Philosophy. His talk, Work on the dual structureof lexical semantic competence, closed the conference on the first day. Startingfrom the exposition of the classic Searle’s Chinese room dilemma (Searle, 1980),Marconi introduced the problem of referential abilities in human language. Marconisubsequently presented data regarding the dissociation between inferential abili-ties and referential abilities as far as semantic processing is concerned. The data(Marconi, 2013) supported the dual picture of human lexical competence that Mar-coni proposes (Marconi, 2003) and that, if adopted, would facilitate artificial systemsin replicating natural-language understanding, according to the author. The fMRIshowed that while inferential tasks are correlated with an activation of left hemi-spheric language areas involved in lexical retrieval, referential ones are associatedwith nonverbal conceptual and structural object processing in the right hemisphere’sareas. All of this is compatible with double dissociations in patients and thereforeconfirms the predictions of Marconi’s model.Guido Gainotti opened the second day of the conference with his lecture Is the
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abstraction capacity due to the amodal format of conceptual representations or tothe power of language?. Guido Gainotti is currently neurology professor at theCatholic University of Rome. Member of many neurological societies, Gainotti hasbeen Secretary General of the Research Group on Aphasia of the World Federationof Neurology and member of the Task Force for Dementia and Cognitive Disordersof the European Federation of the Neurological Societies. In his talk, Gainotti pre-sented a review of experimental results, addressing the semantic hub hypothesis,according to which the amodal format of the conceptual representations can explainabstraction capacity. The model of Patterson and colleagues is based on resultson semantic dementia. To this picture, Gainotti opposes several data regarding thedifferences that seem to emerge in the processing of abstract and concrete concepts,that do not seem therefore to be processed by the same semantic amodal system.Moreover, literature seem to suggest that double dissociations exist between con-cepts characterised by different modalities. The strong left lateralization of abstractwords activation proved by several studies, however, and the linkage between theprocessing of these words and the language areas suggest that the capacity toabstract away from surface similarity could be do due to different functions of lan-guage, such as the capacity to shape informations coming from the external mileauand the fact that encyclopedic information acquired through propositional languageallow us to reach high and abstract level of conceptualization.Professor David Kemmerer is currently full professor at Purdue University inWest Lafayette. He is also adjunct professor in Behavioral Neurology and CognitiveNeuroscience at the University of Iowa. He has been General Editor for Languageand Cognition since it was launched in 2009. In his talk, Professor Kemmerer chal-lenged an assumption that is currently found in many models of cognition, namingthat concepts encoded by words are the same ones used for various non-linguisticpurposes, assuming therefore an overlapping between linguistic tasks and not lin-guistic ones. Kemmerer stresses how this assumption has to deal with an importantfact: there is an incredible high number of human languages (about 6000) in theworld and how they differ as far as categorization and taxonomies are concerned.Once acknowledged this, it is clear that interlinguistic variance has to be taken inconsideration, in order to see whether differences in language reflect on linguistictasks and non linguistic tasks alike. Kemmerer presented a series of interestingdata regarding differences in taxonomies across languages, as far as aspects ofactions, objects parts, opening events, spatial relationships and other domains areconcerned. In an interesting study of 2008 Kemmerer and colleagues (Kemmereret al, 2008) used fMRI to scan brain activity during semantic judgements for fiveclasses of verbs that vary according to five distinct semantic components, namelyaction, motion, contact, change of state and tool use. The core assumption was thataction components depended on primary motor and premotor cortices, the motioncomponent was dependent on the posterolateral temporal cortex, the contact one
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on the intraparietal sulcus and inferior parietal lobule, the change of state on theventral temporal cortex and the tool use on the tempora, parietal, frontal regions. Asthe results were confirmed, the study allowed a mapping of aspects of verb meaning.
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1 On the representation of abstract concepts and wordsGabriella Vigliocco (University College London)
In her lecture, Vigliocco presented the work of her research group during the lastsix years. Their work focused on abstract concepts, mainly considered “hard words”,as they are more difficult to learn and to process, longer and less frequent inlanguages. What is interesting, however, is that even in experimental contexts wherefrequency and length are controlled, there seem to be a delay in their processingcompared to concrete words. This has led to the hypothesis of abstract words beingprocessed through mechanisms that are mainly verbally based in contrast withconcrete words, which might relay in their processing on more imaginability basedmechanisms: this is the Dual Coding theory. According to other hypotheses, suchas Contextual Availability Theory, abstract words have less verbal associations withpossible contexts than concrete ones and are therefore less easy to process. Moregenerally, the role of language has been advocated as central for the processing anduse of abstract words. Lexical decisions studies have been conduced where the socalled concreteness effect has been registered, with an apparent facilitation for theprocessing of concrete words that was correlated with either context availabilityor imageability. More recently, other hypotheses have been put forward, as forinstance semantic diversity: abstract words are more heterogeneous and used inmore varied sentential contexts. Another hypothesis is that they require logicaloperations to compute the meaning.Something that the various proposals have in common is the reliance of languageon verbal information, to an extent that it is greater or different from concrete ones.Similarly, explanations of why abstract concepts are not only processed more slowlybut also learnt later tend to attribute this feature to linguistic and verbal informa-tion. The predominant view is that abstract words are harder to acquire becauseconcrete words have to be learnt before: subsequently, sentence structure has tobecome familiar and, finally, this knowledge allows to make inferences regardingthe meaning of abstract words.Abstract concepts are thought to be acquired mainly after four years old, andthere seems to be a jump around eight years old. However, it is not always thecase that abstract concepts are disadvantaged, as it has famously been proved by
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Vigliocco and Kousta’s group that an advantage can also be registered (Kousta etal, 2009). In a lexical decision study, controlling different variables, when familiarity(subjective one) is controlled, along with imageability, abstract words are processedfaster, which goes against both CAT and DC theories. Note that usually imageabilityis identified in a great deal of studies with concreteness: however, disentanglingthe two variables can lead to interesting results. The so called “abstractness effect”is surely in contrast with the assumptions that drove most of the research in thelast years.By looking at the stimuli, the research group noticed that emotional valencemight have been a interesting variable to look at in order to explain the advantage,considering both positive and negative valence. Indeed, there is a statistical ten-dency for abstract words to have more emotional associations than concrete words,that tend to be more neutral. Valence is regarded here as a general property thatcan be applied to any word in language: so, not only emotion words were consid-ered. Excluding emotion words, however, the same results were achieved.This statistical relation between abstract words and emotions was then inves-tigated during the research. All the lexical variables were controlled a part fromvalence: results showed that the advantage was absent. This drove the researchteam to consider the abstractness effect as an indirect effect of valence. So, va-lenced words are processed faster. This led the team to think that there is an effectof “emotion in disguise”, which is importantly related to the statistical predominanceof affective associations.An fMRI experiment with a lexical decision task (Vigliocco et al. 2013) was de-signed, where different variables were controlled, excluding valence. Abstract itemshad therefore more affective associations. Controlling any possible element thatwould have resulted in an advantage for concrete words, it was not surprising tosee that no differences in activation was present in the scanning. A cluster of ac-tivation for abstract over concrete words was on the other hand registered for therostral anterior cingulate, an area considered to be part of the system that involvesemotional information and has been argued to play an important role in regulatingthe activity of the limbic system, in particular the amigdala. A difference for ab-stract concepts was then seen again, as an indirect measure due to the statisticalpreponderance of affective associations.All of this was however not sufficient to answer to an important question: whywould emotion matter for abstract concepts, and what is its exact role?The hypothesis was that the ontological distinction between abstract and con-crete meanings would turn out to be a distinction between meanings that are primar-ily grounded in sensory-motor experience and those grounded in inner experience.The difference can be read as a difference between abstract emotional words pro-duced by caregivers and bound to internal states and words referring to objects thatare perceivable, in this way creating a distinction between entities in the outside
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world and entities in the mind. This might provide a bootstrapping mechanism forthe acquisition of abstract concepts. Moreover, it has to be noticed that this hypoth-esis has the advantage of defining abstract words in positive terms, as grounded ininternal experience and states, and not in negative terms as compared to concreteones. As a result, according to Vigliocco and her team, the role of language has tobe reconsidered; linguistic information might still have an important role to play,but affective information has to be taken into account as well.A more general hypothesis carried on by the group is that, in the semantic sys-tem, in order to characterise the representation of both concrete and abstract words,it is necessary to integrate sensory-motor information, internal experience (such asthe affective one) and linguistic experience. An optimal system takes advantage ofthe statistical experience derived from both the world and the language.A starting point in thinking about the issue was to carry on a fMRI study inorder to see what else contributes to grounding of abstract concepts, as the groupdid. Words were varying along a continuum from negative to positive valence andvary as much as possible in terms of imageability, in order to see the effect of thetwo variables. A regression was applied, trying to understand whether the variablewere modulating activation once the other factors (frequency, age of acquisition andsuch) we>re taken into account. Based on the previous work, the expectation wasthat the emotional system was going to be engaged for abstract words concerningactivation in the rostral area. If valence is important, one strong hypothesis is thatvalence plays a greater role for abstract ones compared to concrete ones. Theresults, replicating previous studies’ ones, showed an activation in the rostral ACC.The following question was to see whether imageability was the variable modulatingthe activation, but the analysis shown it was not.The effect of valence was similar across the board for more concrete and abstractwords: valence, then, was statistically linked to abstraction but not to be considered“special”. The statistical predominance of emotional features for abstract conceptsdoes not bring along a special role for valence.Shallice and Cooper’s (Shallice and Cooper, 2013) idea is that abstract wordsrequire more logical computation compared to concrete words and this logical com-putations are carried out within frontal areas, in particular within the left inferiorfrontal areas. Hoffman (Hoffman, 2015), in a different way, also has argued thatabstract concepts, because more semantic diverse among themselves, require moreexecutive control functions, that are carried by neuronal populations within the leftinferior frontal area. What should be observed, according to these predictions, isthat less imageable concepts correlate with more activation in these areas of thefrontal lobe. However, what has been found is that no such a difference was present,as there was no cluster in the inferior frontal area for the more abstract words ina lexical decision task. Obviously, the control functions might be then necessaryonly for deeper tasks, being lexical decision too shallow. However, at least it can
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be concluded that these processes are not inherent in the representation of abstractconcepts.Abstract words, in conclusion, tend to be valenced, and concrete ones tend tobe more neutral. Also, there is a processing advantage for abstract words, but it isactually a faster processing for valenced words (“abstract in disguise”). The affectivesystem, according to the results, is more engaged in abstract processing by virtueof this statistical preponderance of emotional features of abstract words, but notbecause of a link between emotion and abstraction.Another part of the research focused on the acquisition of abstract words. Theidea is that emotions might provide a bootstrapping mechanism: children mightlearn that the word happy refers to something internal by looking at the caregiverthat use the word and having all the emotional cues related to this internal state,working as pointer to the shared emotional experience. According to the hypothsis,they subsequently understand the referent of the words and begin to build thedistinction between words that refer to objects in the world and objects that referto internal experience. If this is indeed the case, emotional abstract words shouldbe learnt earlier than the others. Vigliocco pointed out that, looking at normativedata for age of acquisition, what can be found, indeed, is that positive and negativewords are acquired earlier than neutral ones, with a bias for positive valenced ones.What is clear, then, is that emotional abstract vocabulary is learnt earlier.Another study was carried on for lexical decision tasks and others. Monolingualchildren were selected of three age groups. What emerged is that children werebetter with valenced words, both positive and negative ones, whereas the patternchanges with the last age group, where the effect of emotions was reduced. Up tonine years old, the children seemed to use the valence of words; they were betterat recognising the abstract valenced words and the concrete neutral ones. Thepattern changes with older children, with there is much less of a role of emotions,especially for the abstract words: the conclusion is that at this age, children areintegrating two different strategies, namely the one based on extracting informationfrom language or other mechanisms and the one based on emotion. In a sense, thismeans according to the authors that there might be an interesting period right beforethey enter into the teen years in which they pass from a more grounded strategyto a less grounded one, switching between two kind of lexical processing. Thismight be explored further, especially because around this age there is a interestingdevelopment in frontal functions.The group also tested atypical populations, studying children with specific lan-guage impairment and children with autism spectrum disorder. Abstract conceptsare based on linguistic and emotional information: a clear population to test the hy-pothesis on is that of children that have specific language impairments. If you needlanguage in order to learn abstract concepts, you should be especially impaired inlearning abstract concepts if there are difficulties with verbal information. Another
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interesting group is that of children with Autism Spectrum Disorder, as these chil-dren are described as having problems with a specific type of abstract concepts,namely those related to theory of mind. If language development is foundational,children with both ASD and language impairment should be especially impairedin their knowledge of abstract concepts. If emotional information is foundationalthough, the impairment might be relevant for ASD but not for specific languageimpairment children. Note, however, that ASD have often language impairments, soautistic disorder children were separated in two different groups. Results shownoverall lower control, but no difference between the concrete and the abstract words.Children with language impairment only had the same difficulties of children thathad also autism spectrum. Children with ASD without language disorder performedbetter than those with linguistic disorder and ASD symptoms, but there was nodifference between the ASD without language impairment group and the controlone. Consequently, no specific impairment for abstract concepts, and no specificimpairment for valenced words emerged for ASD children. As a result, languageimpairment does not seem to include a specific impairment for abstract words.Although recognising that a lot of data needs thinking and that a great numberof questions still have to be answered, Vigliocco maintains that some important,negative conclusions can be drawn. Traditional views put emphasis on what makesabstract concepts harder and on the role of verbal information and memory forlearning and use of abstract words. But the presented results shown the things canbe seen in another way. Abstract concepts are not always harder; furthermore, somelogic operations are not intrinsic to the processing of abstract concepts Moreover,children with language impairments do not have specific impairments with abstractconcepts. As a results, traditional views should definitely take all of this data intoaccount. Emotion might provide a grounding point for abstract words in virtue of thestatistical predominance of valence in the abstract domain and this can bring abouta processing advantage in adulthood and could bring a developmental advantagein children.
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2 From concepts to lexical semantics: is there a bene-fit?Friedemann Pulvermüller (Freie Universität, Berlin)
Pulvermüller talked about the link between actions, perceptions, words and linguis-tic symbols. The talk focused on how is the meaning of symbols organized in thebrain and which computational and eveolutionary advantages does this organizationentail. One of the main query at the bottom of the presented research was whichneuronal connectivity would casually determine the processes of representations.Lots of semantic theories focus on how explaining meaning in a cognitive model,the most established of which entails closed encapsulated systems in which theconcepts, of amodal nature, are stored and related to each other. However, Pulver-müller underlines, it has been argued that such a system cannot be sufficient forsemantics, as a link between the symbols and the objects, the actual perceptionsin the world, as well as the actions is missing and still has to be explained. As aresult, these amodal symbolic system theories have been challenged for theoreti-cal reasons. In particular, according to the speaker, what is especially missed bypeople interested in neurobiological mechanisms is a neurobiological mechanismthat would underpin conceptual and semantic representations in such as symbolicsystem.According to Pulvermüller, then, the query of semantic processing is mainlyneurobiological. Given this assumption, what is necessary in cognitive models oflanguage is an explanation of why certain brain areas should be adapt to meaningand, generally, language mechanisms. As a result of these assumptions, then, Pul-vermüller argues for the need of well-established symptoms documented in neuro-science, coupled with a set of basic axioms that derive from them and, consequently,the demonstration that neuro-simulations can underpin what the models of languagecognition suggest. This is, as a matter of fact, the core assumption underneath hisresearch.As Pulvermüller underlines, it is well known that there are strong local con-nections in the cortex. However, also more sparse long-distance connectivity ispossible, that allows the neural substrate to build associations and links betweendistant neurons and therefore distinctive cognitive functional clusters. This is thecore assumption underneath the idea of multimodal representations: links between
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different neurons in different areas might lead to binding between different neuralpopulations, so that multimodal representation emerge, as it has been postulatedby neuroanatomists stressing the possibility of the cortex to have associative mem-ory. This “Information mixing” is also supported by the discovery of mirror neurons((Rizzolatti, Gentilucci, et al. 1987; Rizzolatti and Gentilucci 1988). The human brainseems to be especially well-suited to information mixing as far as language is con-cerned, as it is proven by the circuits linking perception of the words to speecharticulation-dedicated neurons in the motor cortex, in the left hemisphere. Also, thehebbian principles establish that if neurons fire together, they wire together; that isto say that repetitive firing of two neurons brings to the formation of an associativelink between the two. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that the formation of linksbetween motor circuits related to the articulation of words and their perceptionemerges in development, when first words are articulated by children learning howto speak; the correlated activation of circuits allowing articulation of sound and thehearing of the same sound patterns is likely to be what allows the perception-motorcircuits to be formed. Therefore, these circuits are assumed to have a relevant roleas far as lexical representation is concerned. Moreover, they can be extended tothe idea of sensory-motor circuits being related to the comprehension and use ofconcepts related to modal action words, leading to the formation of distributed cellcircuits linking information. New symbols correlate with meaningful symbols.The perception of an object and of a word relating to the object might causethe activation of the ventral stream of visual object perception and at the same timean activation in the areas dedicated to the language, thus forming a connectionbetween the two areas. Also, context is supposed to play a meaningful role: if Ihear a new word along with several words I already know, associative links mightbe formed between the semantic information of the known words and the new lexicalform I am learning. This is sometime called parasitic semantic learning.At the same time, it is supposed that visual input associated with auditory stim-uli (so, for instance seeing an image of a crocodile, or an actual one, and hearingthe word “crocodile” at the same time) can form modal circuits relating the visualinformation and the word, forming a semantic circuit that will activate when thesemantic representation is recruited. According to Pulvermüller and colleagues’proposal, the possibility to build distributed neuronal assemblies is the key mecha-nism for linguistic and conceptual capacities, because they allow for differentiatinga vocabulary of actions, symbols and concepts. Higher-order circuits develop thanksto the possibility of hebbian-like links between brain areas, providing the corticalrepresentations and the mechanisms for the processing of meaningful words, linkingverbal representation to modal information. These assumptions are, as a matter offact, confirmed by several findings related to somatotopic activation of the motorcortex in relation to verbs related to arms, legs and face. One of the most influ-ential studies regarding this topic is Hauk and colleagues work (Hauk et al, 2004).
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In a fMRI experiement, activation was checked during the processing of words re-lated to verbs describing actions to be performed by hand, arm and face. Subjectswere submitted to a stimulus they only had to read: face words activated infe-rior frontal premotor areas bilaterally, activation for arm words was found in themiddle frontal gyrus, bilaterally, and in the percentile gyrus of the left hemisphere,whereas leg words elicited activation in pre and post central gyri in dorsal area. Allof these is consistent with the somatotopic organization of the cortex. This showsthat processing of the words related to action triggers activity in the motor cortexin a somatotopic way. These findings have been confirmed by several other studies(Tettamanti, Marco et al. (2005). “Listening to action-related sentences activates thefronto- parietal motor circuits”. In: Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 17.2, pp. 273-281.) and furthermore correlated by results in TMS studies, such as Pulvermüller,Hauk, et al. (2005). In the experiment, transcranic magnetic stimulation was appliedafter 150 ms from the stimulus on the the motor “hand area” and “leg area” whilesubjects were reading words related to arm-actions and leg-actions. The resultsshowed a word-specific effect of the TMS; if it was applied on the motor arm-area,reaction times were lower for arm-related words compared to leg-related ones, andviceversa.Another question arises whether the activation is context dependent: this wasexplored in a study where the same phonological forms in different contexts, wherethe same words acted either as verbs or nouns (for instance “the kick” or “to kick”).It was observed that neural activity depended on the probability of the word to beeither a verb or a noun and on the sentential context.Pulvermüller also presented a relatively controversial issue; if what describedseems to work straightforward for action verbs and meanings, it has to be exploredwhat can be said about internal states and emotions. However, emotional meaningsare reconnected to action semantics according to his view, being just a special casein this category.At the same time, abstract concepts are also supposed to be explainable by thetheory. As abstract words do not have a perceivable referent, whose visual stimulican be related to motor circuits, their case seems to be more difficult: beauty is notinstantiated in the same straightforward way than crocodile, as the word is usedin a variety of contexts that can largely differ from each other and does not have aconcrete perceivable referent. As a matter of fact, the word can used to describe asculpture as well as a face or a cake. However, patterns of family resemblance canbe found between different instantiations of beauty (for instance, harmonious lines,round forms), which could contribute to the formation of modal circuits, albeit notstrong as in the concrete concepts case. Note that also Pulvermüller and colleaguesdo recognise some role to emotional grounding of abstract concepts, as they do citeVigliocco’s and colleagues work in some of their studies (Pulvermüller, 2013).Generally speaking, Pulvermüller points out how it is important to focus on
RIVISTAITALIANADIFILOSOFIAANALITICAJUNIOR6:2(2015)
128
Leda Berio Brain and the Lexicon
subset of abstract words in order to understand how abstract words are grounded,and he focuses on abstract emotion words, just right Vigliocco and colleagues. Ab-stract emotion words are internal states; one assumption is that these words canbe learnt only because they are expressed in actions. Good mood, for instance, canbe understood only if someone is that condition and it expresses it someway. Themotor activation would serve as a link between meaning and symbols; groundingin action is supposed, so processing of abstract words is expected to trigger motorcortex activity. This was confirmed by studies such as Moseley’s one, where theprocessing of abstract words elicited activity in the motor hand representation areaof the cortex (Moseley et al, 2012).The final problem issue that Pulvermüller introduced is that of the functionalrole: does the identified motor activation has one, or is it just a byproduct? Thequestion to be asked, according to Pulvermüller, is whether the activation is fastand automatic; fast, because we might secondary think about actions or objectsepiphenomenally, after the processing, and therefore having motor activation as justa byproduct of the semantic task, thus losing its functional role. The immediateunderstanding process is to be distinguished by the epiphenomenal effects. Also, ithas to be automatic, as it has to be independent by attention. Finally, the casualrole has to be proved. Some answers to these questions have been given; a seriesof experiment has been carried on, where it has been verified that activation is fastand present even in absence of attention, as the participants were distracted byother stimuli . As far as the casual role is concerned, TMS studies have shownthat electric stimulation of the motor areas semantically related to the words inthe task has influence on the task performance. Also, this has been supportedby findings related to patients that have lesions in the relevant brain areas. Forinstance, patients with small tumours in the motor cortex were found to have specificimpairments for abstract words processing and tool words processing as well.The motor system, in conclusion, seems to contribute to semantic understanding,as the activations are automatic and immediate. Also, the functional relevance seemsto be confirmed by TMS studies. In a nutshell, modality preferential areas seem tobe important for semantic understanding.However, there is still the possibility that, even though activation of motor systemis present, it is epiphenomenal. Is there a strong evidence from the perspective ofexperimental neurolinguistics? Is it possible to agree on a semantic index everybodywould be happy with? So the question to be asked is whether there is meaning inthe motor system, and this requires an index of semantic process, which is to bebased on semantic priming. The semantic priming effect has physiological basis,and it might be asked whether the motor system supports semantic priming inthe sense that it shows its brain correlates. A recent experiment has been donein order to address the issue, and the results confimed a semantic priming effect,suggesting that activity in sensory and motor areas during conceptual processing
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can also occur unconsciously and it is not necessarily caused by a vivid consciousexperience (Trumpp et al, 2013).According to the data presented, Pulvermüller concluded, the motor system isan example of modal system that is active and necessary for category semanticprocessing, and it also reflects semantic priming. A range of semantic hub areasare active and necessary for general semantic processes and also reflect semanticpriming, so both semantic hubs and category specificity have to be explained. Sucha model relies, as it should be according to the premises that were given, on basicneuroscience established principles.
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